

105

105

(19)

APPENDIX I

SUTRA READINGS

A

Readings unique to Srikantha.

II, 1.

17: Sattvāccāparasya (not "avarasya," as in other texts).

II, 3.

48: Asantateścāvyatirekaḥ (not "avyatikaraḥ").

III, 1.

22: Tatsvābhāvyāpattirupapatteḥ (*neither* "Sābhāvyapattih," etc., *nor* "Tat sābhāvyāpatih," etc.).

III, 3.

2: Bhedāditi ced ekasyāmapī (*neither* "Bhedānneti cen naikasyāmapī" *nor* "Bhedānneti ced ekasyāmapī").

29 & 30: Upapānastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherloka-vat: gaterarthavattvam ubhayathānyathāhi virodhaḥ (not in the reverse order, as read by Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Ānanda Tīrtha, Vallabha, Vijñāna Bhīkṣu, and Baladeva).

38: Kāmādayastatratatra cāyatanādibhyaḥ (not "Kāmāditara," etc.).

IV, 2.

4: So'dhvaksena tadunagamādibhyaḥ (not "So'dh").

B

Readings common to Srikantha and Ramanuja,
and occasionally to other commentators as well,
but not to Saṁkara.

N: Nimbārka; M: Madhva; Bh: Bhāskara; R: Rāmānuja;
Ś: Śaṁkara; Śri: Śrikanṭha.

I, 1.

9: Pratijñā virodhāt (omitted by all except N).

I, 2.

16: Ata eva ca sa brahma (omitted by all others
except N, who reads "tad brahma" not "sa
brahma").

19: Antaryāmyadhidaivādhilokādiṣu taddharma-
vyapadeśāt (M agrees with Ś in omitting
"loka" in "lokādiṣu"; N agrees with Bh in
adopting present text).

20 & 21: Na ca smārtamataddharmābhilāpāc-
chārīraśca; ubhayepi hi bhedenainamadhi-
yate (the second sūtra does not begin with
"Śārīraśca ubhayepi", etc., as in other
texts).

I, 3.

3: Nānumānamatacchabdāt, prāṇabhṛcca (not two
sūtras as elsewhere).

34 & 35: Kṣatriyatvāvagatēśca; uttaratra caitra-
rathena līngāt (not one sūtra).

38 & 39: Śravanādhyañānārthapratīṣedhāt; smṛteś-
ca (not one sūtra; N adopts the present
reading).

I, 4.

26 & 27: Ātmakṛteḥ; pariṇāmāt (not one sūtra).

II, 1.

11 & 12: Tarkāpratīṣṭhānāt; anyathānumeyamiti
cet evamāpyanirmokṣaprasaṅgaḥ (not one
sūtra).

II, 1.

18: Asadvyapadeśānneti cen na dharmāntareṇa
vākyaśeṣāt, yukteḥ śabdāntarācca (one sūtra,
not two; N adopts the present reading).

20: Yathā ca prāṇādiḥ (not prāṇādi; N adopts
present reading).

35: Na karmavibhāgāditi cen na anāditvāt, upa-
padyate cāpyupalabhyate ca (not two sūtras;
N adopts present reading).

II, 2.

1: Rācanānupapatteś ca nānumānam, pravṛtteś ca
(not two sūtras).

8: "Abhyupagame'pyarthābhāvāt" comes after
"Anyatrābhāvācca na tṛṇādivat" (II, 2, 4)
in Śaṁkara, Bhāskara, Nimbārka and Ānan-
da Tīrtha; whereas the fifth sūtra according
to Śrikanṭha and Rāmānuja is "Puruṣāśma-
vaditi cet tathāpi".

18: Itaretarapratyayatvāt upapannamiti cen na
saṅghātabhāvānimittatvāt (M & N also adopt
this reading; Ś reads "Itaretarapratyayat-
vāditi cenna utpattimātranimittatvāt", and
Bh reads "Itaretarapratyayamanyatvādupa-
pannam iti cen na, saṅghātabhāvānimittat-
vāt").

31: Śri, R and Bh omit the sūtra read as "kṣaṇi-
katvācca" by Ś and M, and as "kṣaṇikat-
vāt" by N.

38: Śri, R and Bh omit "Saṁbandhānupapatteś
ca" (read as a separate sūtra by Ś, M and
N).

II, 3.

3: Gaṇyasambhavāt, śabdācca (not two sūtras).

5 & 6: Pratijñāhāniravyatīrēkāt; śabdebhyaḥ (not
one sūtra).

12 & 13: Pṛthivī; adhikārarūpaśabdāntarebhyah
(not one sūtra).

II, 3.

- 18: Nātmā śruteḥ, etc., not Nātmā'śruteḥ, etc. (na +ātmā+āśruteḥ).
 27: Vyatireko gandhavat, tathā hi darśayati (not two sūtras; N adopts present reading).
 34: Upādānāt, vihāropadeśācca (not two sūtras, nor in the order "Vihāropadeśāt; upādānāt", as read by Ś, Bh, N, and M).
 43: Mantra varṇāt (not mantravarṇācca; Bh adopts present reading).

II, 4.

- 2: Gaunyasambhavāt, tatprāk śruteś ca (not two sūtras).
 13: Jyotirādyadhiṣṭhānam tu tadāmananāt, prāṇ-
 avatā śabdāt (not two sūtras).
 16: Bhedaśruter, vailakṣaṇyācca (not two sūtras; N adopts present reading).

III, 1.

- 9: Caranāditi cen na tadupalakṣaṇārtheti kārṣ-
 nājiniḥ (not "upalakṣaṇārtheti", etc.; N
 adopts the present reading).

III, 2.

- 4 & 5: Are read as sūtras 5 & 6 by Ś, Bh, N, and
 M.
 12: Bhedāditi cen na pratyekamatadvacanāt (not
 "Na bhedāditi", etc.; N adopts present read-
 ing).
 20: Vṛddhihrāsabhāktvamantarbhāvādubhayasa-
 mañjasyādevam, darśanāc ca (not two sū-
 tras).

III, 3.

- 24: Puruṣavidyāyāmapī ca itareṣāmanāmnānāt
 (not "puruṣavidyāyām iva", etc.; N adopts
 present reading).
 32: Aniyamassarveṣāmavirodhaś śabdānumānā-
 bhyām (not "sarvāsām", etc.; N adopts pre-
 sent reading).

III, 3.

- 31: "Yāvadadhikāram", etc., comes before the
 above sūtra, and not after it, as in Ś, Bh, N,
 and M.
 35: Antarā bhūtagrāmavat svātmano'nyathā bhe-
 dānupapatter iti cen na upadeśavat (not two
 sūtras, nor "upadeśāntaravat"; N reads as
 one sūtra, but "upadeśāntaravat").
 46: Vidyaiva tu nirdhāraṇāt, darśanāc ca (not
 two sūtras; N adopts present reading).

III, 4.

- 7: Niyamāt (not "niyamācca").
 27: Śamadamādyupetasyāt tathāpi tu tadvidhes-
 tadaṅgatayā teṣāmapī avaśyānuṣṭheyatvāt
 (Ś, Bh, N, and M omit "api" in "teṣā-
 mapi").
 42: Upapūrvamapītyeke bhāvamaśanavat tādū-
 kam (not "apītyeke").
 46: "Śruteśca" is read as sūtra 46 by Ś; it is omit-
 ted by Bh, Śri, N, and M.
 50: Aihikamaprastutapratibandhe taddarśanāt (Ś,
 Bh, and N read "api" between "aihiham"
 and "aprastuta").

IV, 1.

- 19: Bhogena tvitare kṣapayitvātha sampadyate (Ś
 and Bh omit "atha" between "kṣapayitvā"
 and "sampadyate").

IV, 2.

- 11: Asyaiva copapatterūṣmā (Ś and Bh introduce
 "eṣa" between "upapatteḥ" and "ūṣmā").
 12: Pratiṣedhāditi cenna śārīrāt, spaṣṭo hy eke-
 ṣām (not two sūtras; Bh and N adopt the
 present reading).
 20: Yoginaḥ prati smaryate smārte caite (Ś and
 Bh introduce "ca" after "prati").

IV, 3.

- 5: "Ubhaya vyāmohāt tatsiddheḥ" read as sūtra 5 by Ś is omitted by all others.
 13: Na ca kārye pratyabhisandhiḥ (not "prati-patyabhisandhiḥ").
 14: Apratikālabhanānnayatīti bādarāyaṇaḥ ubhayathā ca doṣāt tatkratuś ca (not "ubhaya-thādoṣat", etc.; M adopts the present reading).

The expression "present reading" has been used to refer to the reading adopted by Śrikanṭha.

C

Readings common to Srikantha and Samkara or others, but not to Ramanuja.

II, 3.

- 44: Api ca smaryate not api smaryate.
 49: Ābhāsā eva ca not ābhāsa eva ca.

III, 1.

- 15: Api ca sapta not api sapta.

III, 4.

- 30: Api ca smaryate not api smaryate.

IV, 2.

- 2: Ata eva ca sarvāṇyanu not ata eva sarvāṇyanu.

IV, 4.

- 8: Saṁkalpādeva tu tacchruteḥ not saṁkalpādeva tacchruteḥ.

Nimbārka agrees with Śrikanṭha in the reading of II, 3, 49 and III, 4, 30.

Note.—It will be seen from Appendices I: A, B and C that the difference in textual readings between Śrikanṭha and Rāmānuja extends only to about 13 sūtras, that the difference is of little significance in respect of the texts noted in I: C, and that there is a very large degree of correspondence between the readings of the two.

APPENDIX II

Doctrinal affinities to the Sruti-sukti-mala of Haradattacarya.

SLOKAS

- 11 to 14: Reference to Śiva as the head; yasmai namas tacchiraḥ. The Divya Śiśumāra of the *Taittirīya Āraṇyaka*, II, 19 mentions all other deities and identifies them with other parts of the body. Śiva alone is the head, the Being worthy of adoration. (*Br. M.*, IV, 1, 5).
 17: Śiva stands related to the Universe as controlling it, as the embodied one stands in relation to the body. This is the significance of such passages as "Śva-bhyaś śvapātibhyaś ca vonamaḥ". (*Br. M.*, IV, 1, 5).
 25: Rudra, as a name of Śiva, the Supreme Being, means he who drives away the sorrows of bondage (saṁsāra rug drāvakaḥ). (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 2; IV, 1, 12).
 36 to 39: The principal deity inculcated by the *Mahā-nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad* is Śiva, as determined by the rules of interpretation upakrama, upasaṁhāra, etc. Nārāyaṇa is but an upāsaka (a devotee), as established by the method of residues and the text "tasyāś śikhāyāmadhye paramātmā vyavasthitaḥ". (*Br. M.*, I, 2, 3, and 4; 8).
 42: Nārāyaṇa's identity with the Supreme Brahman is of the same kind as that experienced by Ṛṣi Vāmadeva or the identity of the magician, who incants the Garuḍa Mantra, with Garuḍa. (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 21; III, 2, 24).
 43, 44: The teaching imparted and the form exhibited by Kṛṣṇa to Arjuna, came from the Lord, having been acquired by Yoga. (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 31; I, 2, 6).
 44: The non-mention of Viṣṇu among the vibhūtis of Śiva in the *Mahopaniṣad*, is cured by his being mentioned as such in the *Kaivalya Upaniṣad*. (*Br. M.*, I, 2, 4).

SLOKAS

- 45: Nārāyaṇa is mūla prakṛti; Śiva operates thereon as nimitta kāraṇa. (*Br. M.*, I, 2, 3 and 8).
- 56 & 57: The person within the Sun is Śiva as seen from the appellations Hiraṇyagarbha, Āmbikāpati, Umāpati, etc. Śrīkaṇṭha refutes the reference to Nārāyaṇa implied in passages like “dhyeyas sadā savitr maṇḍala madhyavartī, etc.” He also explains “Kapyāsam puṇḍarikam, etc.”, a text not referred to by Rāmānuja in this context. (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 21 and 22).
- 87: In the *Camaka*, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, Indra, and other deities are mentioned along with objects desired, such as food, etc.; Śiva, by the method of residues, must be the bestower of these gifts, He not being mentioned with the rest. (*Br. M.*, III, 2, 38).
- 108: The Vedas, whether self-created or created by the Lord Śiva, are of unquestionable authority. Other sciences may claim truth only in so far as they do not contradict the Śruti and the degree of truth possessed by each depends on the status of its author. (*Br. M.*, I, 1, 3).
- 111: “Adhvanām adhvapate śreṣṭhasyādhvanah pāramasīya” is a Vedic hymn (from the *Ekāgni Kāṇḍa*) mentioning the adhvās, their relative superiority and inferiority and their relation to Śiva, as their Lord. The adhvā doctrine is thus not an āgamic innovation. The Āgamas proceeding from Śiva, the supreme ascetic, must have greater authority than the Kalpa Sūtras, at least, the latter being revealed only by other ascetics, lower in the scale of perfection. (*Cp. Br. M.*, I, 1, 3 and II, 2, 38).
- 138: Not even Śiva can arbitrarily change the nature of things. Birth is not voluntary, but due to karma. (*Cp. Br. M.*, III, 3, 30, where it is said that the continuance of saṃsāra is not possible apart from karma; also III, 1, 22, where it is said that one thing cannot become another).

APPENDIX III-A.

Resemblances between Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhasya and the Śrī Bhasya.

I, 1.

- 1: Interpretation of “atha” as marking the introduction of a fresh topic in the continuous treatment of what is essentially one Śāstra, this usage of “atha” being paralleled by the commencement of Chapter III of the *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā*.
- 4: Discussion of the theory that words denote only acts or things pertaining to acts, and the consequent objection that Śruti cannot give us knowledge of an already accomplished Being. Rāmānuja's treatment of this topic occurs under sūtra I, 1, 1.
- 13 *et seq*: The ānandamaya self is definitely and finally settled to be Brahman, the position not being provisionally accepted and finally refuted, as by Śaṅkara.
- 21: The interpretation of kapyāsam puṇḍarikam, as the lotus made to bloom forth by the Sun. This interpretation does not find a place in the *Śrī Bhāṣya*, in the discussion of the present sūtra which treats of the golden person within the Sun, but in the *Vedārtha Saṅgraha*.
- 32: Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha agree in taking the sūtra to mention with approval the existence of three forms of meditation on Brahman—in itself, in the bodies of the enjoyers, and as the object enjoyed. This is mentioned by Śaṅkara only as an alternative interpretation.

I, 2.

24: The rūpopanyāsa is taken to refer to *Muṇḍaka*, II, 1, 4, ff., as by Śaṅkara in the first of the views presented by him. But there is no mention of Śaṅkara's second view taking the reference to be to *Muṇḍaka*, II, 1, 10.

32: The subject-matter of the sūtra is considered to be the identification in contemplation of the prāṇahuti with the agnihotra.

I, 3.

14: Agreement in respect of the text cited, referring to people who wander about over hidden treasure, not knowing the treasure (*Ch.*, VIII, 3, 2), and also in respect of the last sentence of Śrīkaṇṭha's bhāṣya; this bhāṣya is very condensed while Rāmānuja's is explanatory.

I, 4.

6: The two agree in the enumeration of the three questions propounded by Naciketas, as relating to Upāsya, Upāsana and Upāsaka, unlike Śaṅkara who takes the three to refer to the boons, which related respectively to the welfare of the father of the Naciketas, the knowledge of the Trināciketa fire, and the selves (both higher and lower).

9 & 10: The interpretation of "ajā" with reference to the *Mahānārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*; as also the explanation of the term "unborn" as applied to prakṛti that is controlled by the Lord.

13: The expression "pañcajanāḥ" occurs almost immediately after the reference to the Lord "Jyotiṣām jyotiḥ", the light of lights; hence "pañcajanāḥ" probably has the same sense as the first jyoti, which here means the senses, which light up their objects, as it were.

II, 1.

18: The defects of the effect do not inhere in the cause. The conception of the world as the body of the Lord; change, ignorance, etc., belong to the body, while permanence, omniscience and so on belong to the Lord.

15-20: General agreement as to the identity of cause and effect and the notion of the former as sūkṣma—cidacid—prapañca—viśiṣṭa—Brahman, the latter being sthūla—cidacid—prapañca—viśiṣṭa—Brahman.

22: Reference to and criticism of the bhedābheda—vāda. (This occurs in II, 1, 21 of the *Śrī Bhāṣya* and is not in the same terms as Śrīkaṇṭha's).

II, 2.

23: Both commentators refer to the flight of birds in ākāśa as disproving the Buddhist view of ākāśa as a form of non-existence.

30: This is recognised by both as a separate adhi-karaṇa, refuting the Mādhyamika doctrine; Śaṅkara does not recognise a new topic, while Bhāskara omits even the sūtra.

II, 3.

4: The words "anuṣaṅgepi śravaṇāvṛttāviva" occur in both commentaries, in answer to an objection that the same word cannot be taken both literally and in a secondary sense, unless it is used more than once, as happens in the case of the word "Brahman". This objection is set forth by Rāmānuja, but not by Śrīkaṇṭha.

7: Common illustration from the reference by a father to his many sons; he says he has ten sons, indicates them and mentions some by name; the others not named are also his sons. Similarly, whatever is a modification is originated and ākāśa is among these.

II, 3.

- 8: Both give the same reason for treating of the origination of vāyu in a fresh topic, the reason being that the next sūtra speaks of the origination of fire, which is said to come out of vāyu.
- 10-16: General resemblance in respect of the doctrine that fire, water, and earth are caused by Brahman, not by each preceding element in the causal chain.
- 17: Words have Brahman for their primary and not their secondary sense. To support this interpretation, a negative particle has to be imported into the text of the sūtra; and the two commentators agree as to this importation. (Tadvyapadeśo bhāktah read as tadvyapadeśaḥ abhāktah).
- 29-32: General agreement in interpreting these as concerned in justifying the use of the name "knowledge" in the case of the self who is the "knower".
- 45: Relationship of the jīva to Brahman compared to that of a part to the whole, light to what is luminous, quality to the qualified, genus to species, the body to the embodied.

II, 4.

- 2: Gaṇyasambhavāttatprākśruteśca: both commentators take the first part of the sūtra to state that the passage about the senses having existed prior to creation, is not to be interpreted literally, as it is gaṇī; they differ from Śaṅkara, who thinks that that part of the sūtra asserts the impossibility of taking the statements about the creation of the senses as gaṇī in significance.
- 3: Speech is itself one of the senses; and speech is impossible in the absence of name and form, of which the Lord is the Creator; hence one at least of the senses is created. The

II, 4.

above interpretation is common to both, but Rāmānuja's mode of stating it is fuller and clearer, though in the previous sūtra, his commentary is meagre as compared with Śrīkaṇṭha's.

- 15: Agreement in respect of the siddhānta that the senses are distinct from mukhya prāṇa. The support from Smṛti "Indriyāṇi daśaikam ca" is also common to both.
- 16: Agreement in respect of the siddhānta that the senses are different from mukhya prāṇa.
- 17: Śaṅkara says that the next sūtra "māmsādi bhaumam yathāśabdāmitarayośca" is a reply to some foreseen objection, but does not specify the objection. Rāmānuja and Śrīkaṇṭha indicate this objection, viz., that whatever may have happened before the creation of Brahmā, at least after his creation, he should be recognised as the Being that renders tripartite, as this function is continued even later, e.g., in the triple partition of food into faeces, flesh and the mind.

III, 2.

- 1-6: Agreement in respect of arrangement of the sūtras (see Appendix I), as also in the interpretation thereof, esp. the doctrine that dreams are māyāmātram. Dreams are wonderful in that they are momentary and can be perceived only by the individual experiencing them, and hence their creation must be ascribed only to the Lord who alone has satyasaṁkalpa.
- 20: Though Brahman resides within, He does *not* participate in increase and decrease. The sūtra, as it stands, contains no negative particle, to show that such participation is denied. Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja agree in importing this meaning.

III, 3.

- 2: Agreement in the interpretation of the words "ekasyām api" as referring to the identity of vidyā in spite of repetitions, such repetitions being due only to differences among learners. (In the previous sūtra Śaṅkara and Śrīkaṇṭha mention the identity of the pañcāgni-vidyās of the Chandogya and the Vājasaneyins, but Rāmānuja makes no reference to this.)
- 8: The illustration from the word "agnihotra" used of different objects of injunction going by the same name, is common to both commentators.
- 9: The vyāpti mentioned in this topic is interpreted by both to extend only to the whole of the Chāndogya, not to all the Vedas.
- 12: "Priyaśirastvādyaprāptiḥ", etc.; both commentators understand the sūtra to say that the predication of joy as the head and so on would make Brahman subject to increase and decrease, while Śaṅkara says that joy, etc., are capable of increase and decrease and these are characteristic of plurality, which is not to be imported into Brahmanvidyā.
- 14-17: Both understand the sūtras to relate to certain Taittiriya passages, while Śaṅkara considers the viśaya-vākyas to come from the Kaṭha and Aitareya Upaniṣads (but see Appendix III-C).
- 19: Agreement in taking the sūtra to discuss the identity of the Śaṅḍilya vidyās in the Agni-rahasya and in the Brhadāranyaka Upaniṣad. In one case greatness is mentioned, and realisation of all purposes; in the other, smallness, control and rulership. But the vidyās are identical, since they are equal in respect of manomayatva and other guṇas; thus the two pairs of qualities are not op-

III, 3.

- posed. There is, however, another difference noticed by Śrīkaṇṭha—that Brahman is to be meditated on, in one case as ether, and in the other as rice or barley. This is a more serious difficulty which Śrīkaṇṭha evades, while Rāmānuja avoids it altogether, as he does not mention it at all.
- 26: Agreement in the doctrine that the abandonment of punya and pāpa necessarily goes with their being taken up by others, since there can be neither mere abandonment nor mere taking up.
 - 34: "Iyadāmananāt" is taken by both to be part of Akṣaraddhi adhikaraṇa, stating that only so much has to be imported as will effectively bring about the meditation of Brahman as different from all other things. Śaṅkara understands the sūtra to relate to those texts which speak about the "two birds".
 - 36: "Vyatihāro viśimṣanti hi itaravat" is understood by both to state that since the answers given to Uṣasti and Kahoḷa relate to the same Being, there should be an exchange of ideas between the two vidyās. They differ from Śaṅkara, who takes the sūtra to refer to the meditation on "I am Thou. Thou art I" and the frequent passage of the mind from one to the other.
 - 37: All the questions and answers refer to one and the same thing, the Highest Lord, as seen from the words repeated at the end of every answer "That is the True, That is the Self, That thou art." Rāmānuja condemns Śaṅkara's interpretation; Śrīkaṇṭha is content with stating his own position which is the same as Rāmānuja's.
 - 39: Though Śrīkaṇṭha makes out that the sūtra declares itself against the rejection of qualities like blue-throatedness, etc., in the medita-

III, 3.

tion of Brahman, there is agreement between him and Rāmānuja in respect of the appeal made to the authority of Śruti. Those who recognise the authority of Śruti must admit that in the case of Dharma and Brahman, not cognisable by other means of knowledge, that form which is taught in the Śruti should be recognised.

40: In the view of Śrīkaṇṭha, the sūtra establishes that the higher knowledge of the released person relates to Brahman with qualities and not to Brahman devoid of attributes, and that the negative texts indicate the absence only of objectionable qualities. The same topic is dealt with by Rāmānuja, a little more elaborately in the three sūtras 38, 39 and 40.

56: Repeats the idea of III, 3, 42, that meditations may have to be kept distinct in spite of their having an identical object. Both Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja justify the repetition on the ground that it is directed to the refutation of those who maintain that knowledge is not an object of injunction, presumably by showing that not one but many injunctions apply to knowledge.

III, 4.

11: "Vibhāgaś śatavat" is taken by both to refer to the case of a person getting two hundred, a hundred each from the sale of the gem and of the lands.

IV, 1.

16-18: Constitute the agnihōtrādhikaraṇa; both commentators agree on the efficacy of agnihotra, etc., especially, in sūtras 17 and 18.

IV, 2.

11-13: Agreement with Rāmānuja, from the statement about the heat of the subtle body right up to the mention of the support given by

IV, 2

Śruti to the doctrine of departure by the mūrdhanya nāḍi.

20: The expression "kāla" used in the Gītā teaching about the paths, is interpreted by both to refer to the presiding deities, who serve as guides from stage to stage of the paths mentioned; Śaṅkara understands "kāla" to mean time.

IV, 4.

7: The state of liberation is one of equality with Brahman in respect of both self-illumination and the possession of all auspicious qualities. Śaṅkara would admit the latter aspect, only "with a view to the world of appearances".

15 & 16: Both commentators affirm pervasiveness to be characteristic of the released soul and justify this. The attribute mentioned in the sūtra is taken by Śaṅkara to be more a power of multiplication than one of pervasion, being comparable to the lighting of several lamps from the flame of one lamp; in any case, pervasiveness being, according to him, a minor lordly power it may be attained long before release and is in no way characteristic of that state.

17-21: As treated by both Śrīkaṇṭha and Rāmānuja, sūtra 21 "Bhogamātrasāmyalingācca" repeats the ideas and arguments of sūtra 17: "Jagatvyāpāravarjam prakaraṇāt asannihi-tatvācca". Śaṅkara takes up a different line of interpretation and thus avoids the redundancy. Sūtra 17 is concerned to establish the dependence of the released soul on the Lord for whatever powers the former acquires. This notion of dependence promptly dismisses all notions of equality, though there may be considerable similarity left; what this similarity extends to, is determined by sūtra 21, as Śaṅkara interprets it.

APPENDIX III-B.

Resemblances between Srikantha's Bhasya and the Samkara Bhasya.

- I, 1.
2: Judgments like "san ghaṭah, san paṭah" reveal, in their existential aspect, the continuous presence of Brahman.
- I, 3.
30: The sūtra "madhvādiṣvasambhavādanadhikāram Jaiminiḥ" forms part of the Devatādhikaraṇa, not a new topic.
40 & 41: "Kampanāt" and Jyotirdarśanāt" constitute two new topics.
- II, 1.
3: Agreement in respect of the argument that the Yoga possesses but a limited degree of validity, the primary object of that Smṛti being to teach "citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ".
- II, 3.
9: The sūtra is taken to declare that Brahman is unoriginated, though the last sentence of Śrikantha's commentary connects with Rāmānuja's view of the sūtra as establishing that everything but Brahman is originated.
19: This is an adhikaraṇa by itself establishing that the jīva is a cogniser; the topic is distinct from that of the succeeding sūtras 20 to 32, though Rāmānuja reads all these as belonging to one adhikaraṇa.
- II, 4.
15: Agreement in respect of the pūrvapakṣa that the sense-organs are functions of the mukhya prāṇa; the *prima facie* view, according

APPENDIX III-B

331

II, 4.

to Rāmānuja, is that the mukhya prāṇa is also a sense-organ.

III, 1.

12-21: For Śrikantha as for Śaṅkara the statement of the pūrvapakṣa is confined to sūtra 12 while for Rāmānuja it goes on to sūtra 16, the "ārohāvaroha" of sūtra 13 being understood by the latter as ascent and descent after sojourn in Yamaloka. The reference to Citragupta in sūtra 16 is also common to Śaṅkara. (The seven hells constitute Yama-loka, for though they are primarily controlled by Citragupta and others, they function under the direction of Yama.)

III, 2.

7: In the statement of the pūrvapakṣa favouring the disjunctive interpretation of the statements as to the nādis, puritat, and so on, the same arguments are used as by Śaṅkara, viz., identity of purpose (i.e., sleep), the illustration from the use of rice excluding that of barley, and so on.
10: Agreement with Śaṅkara in contrasting swoon with sleep in respect of the distortion of countenance present in the former case, but not in the latter.

III, 3.

1 & 2: Assertion of the identity of the two pañcāgni vidyās.
5: Agreement in respect of general exposition, and the illustration from the upasamhāra of the complementary elements of one religious duty, say, agnihotra.
9: Agreement in the recognition of a new topic (the vyāptyadiḥikaraṇa). Śaṅkara undertakes an elaborate inquiry into the precise nature of the sāmānādhikaraṇya between prāṇa and udgītha, whether it is adhyāsa or apavāda or ekatva or viśeṣaṇa, and con-

III, 3.

cludes that the last alone is appropriate. Śrīkaṇṭha takes this conclusion for granted, and passes on from sāmānādhikarāṇya to viśeṣaṇa viśeṣyatā (the latter relationship is said to *come about*, but *how* we are not told). In the conclusion that the praṇava is qualified by the udgītha, there is agreement; but not in the argument, where Śrīkaṇṭha presumes what is proved by Śaṅkara, and shows agreement with Rāmānuja.

- 10: In the statement of both pūrvapakṣa and siddhānta (about the prāṇa which is mentioned as the best being understood to be also the richest, etc., these other qualities finding mention only in certain texts), Śrīkaṇṭha has far greater affinities with Śaṅkara than with Rāmānuja, even down to the illustration from the attributes of Devadatta as known at one place, being called to mind when he is encountered at another place.
- 31: Agreement in the recognition of a new topic treating of persons placed in certain responsible positions, like Vasiṣṭha and so on.
- 41: Affinity in respect of the declaration of the independent and injunctive character of the meditation on the udgītha, though the text is couched in the indicative mood.
- 57: The vidyās are optional. To pass to a fresh mode of contemplation would distract the mind which has already attained its goal by one such method.

III, 4.

- 14: Reference is made to "Na karma lipyate nare" unlike Rāmānuja who cites the text "Īśāvāsyam idam sarvam", etc.
- 51: Liberation is one and uniform, there being no grades therein, as in the fruit of karma; for, the fruit of all meditation is asserted to be the condition of Brahman which is one.

III, 4.

(Rāmānuja takes sūtras 50 and 51 to deal with knowledge leading to worldly exaltation and that which brings about release, there being no prescription as to the time when either result is attained, the only determinant being the absence of counteracting conditions.)

IV, 1.

- 1: Meditation on Brahman has to be repeated, not performed just once, as in the prayājas: there is no analogy with the latter, since this is directed to securing an unseen result, whereas Brahmanvidyā is a means to a visible result; and where the result can be seen, repetition is necessary till the result is attained, as in the husking of paddy.
- 3: Brahman is to be contemplated as identical with the self, not as other than the self.
- 6: The whole argument about the super-imposition of Āditya, etc., on the udgītha savours strongly of Śaṅkara, in respect of both the pūrvapakṣin's attitude of indifference as to which is to be superimposed on the other, and the appeal to the text "yadeva vidyayā karoti, tadeva vīryavattaram bhavati" in support of the siddhānta.

IV, 2.

- 1, 2 & 3-6: Speech merges in the mind, the mind in the chief vital air and so on, at the time of departure. The merger is not one of essential nature, as of an effect in its material cause, but one of function only; it is not interpreted, as by Rāmānuja, to indicate a mere "going-with" or a conjunction.

APPENDIX III-C.

Topics distinctively treated by Srikantha.

I, 1.

17-20: The whole topic disposes of the notion of Hiranyagarbha as the First Cause. The expression Prajāpati is equated with Paśupati. The sūtra "Kāmācca nānumānāpekṣā" receives a novel interpretation, to the effect that the creation ascribed to the *desire* of Prajāpati is only avāntara sṛṣṭi and that Prajāpati is only the śeṣa of Brahman, as seen from Śruti.

21 & 22: The golden person within the Sun is none other than the three-eyed Śiva, though only two eyes are mentioned; there is no mention of the third eye, as that is generally closed, and cannot be compared to the lotus that has opened out; the golden person is not Nārāyaṇa, as may be seen from the reference to Rudra, Hiranyabāhu, Ambikāpati and so on.

31: While Śaṅkara takes śāstra drṣṭi to reveal identity, Rāmānuja holds that the knowledge attained is to the effect that all names denote Brahman, all other objects being His bodies, as it were. Srikanṭha gives both interpretations, the latter first. That he himself believed in the realisation of parāhambhāva is shown in his commentary on IV, 1, 3; IV, 4, 19, and so on.

I, 2.

3-8: Nārāyaṇa is not Brahman, the former being an upāśaka and the latter upāśya, and for various other reasons. The *Mahopaniṣad* identifies Parameśvara with the Supreme

I, 2.

Brahman; the mention of Nārāyaṇa comes later and cannot avail to disturb the identification already effected.

9 & 10: The cause of destruction must also be the cause of creation. Hence, Parameśvara alone is the First Cause.

11: The two selves that entered the cave are the jīva and Parameśvara, as enjoyment may be predicated of both, though the object of enjoyment is different in either case. The real difference between the two is not in respect of enjoyment, but in that the former is paratantra, while the latter is svatantra, the former ignorant, the latter knowing, the former anādi-mala-baddha, the latter anādi-mala-mukta.

18: The Self that is of the size of the thumb is Brahman.

20: A jumbling together of different constructions is seen here. Pradhāna and the jīva are excluded from identification with the antaryāmin, the former on the ground that what it possesses, viz., inertness, non-intelligence, etc., are incompatible with antaryāmitva, the latter because of what it does not possess, viz., sarvaniyāmakatva, etc., which are qualities required in the internal ruler.

30 & 31: Srikanṭha like Śaṅkara takes "abhi-vyakti" to mean "manifestation", and "anusmṛti" to be "remembrance", unlike Rāmānuja who understands thereby "definiteness" and "meditation" respectively. But in sūtra 31, Srikanṭha, unlike Śaṅkara (and like Rāmānuja), is thinking not of the prādeśa-mātra but the description of head and limbs in a human being. In Sūtra 30, Srikanṭha seems to agree with Śaṅkara.

33: The declaration of Śruti that the Lord is present within as enjoyer is illustrated by re-

I, 2

ference to the text "Śivo mā viśāpradāhāya", etc.

I, 3.

1: "Dyubhāvādyāyatana" sūtra. The pūrvapakṣa relates to vāyu, according to our author, not to the pradhāna as for Śaṅkara or to the jīva as for Rāmānuja. Further, this exemplifies a peculiarity of Śrīkaṇṭha's Bhāṣya—the attempt to confine each sūtra to a consideration of a particular topic or view or aspect. Thus, the pūrvapakṣa about pradhāna and the jīva is considered in I, 3, 3.

3: The reading of the sūtra corresponds to Rāmānuja's, but the mode of interpretation differs. The syntactical construction of a single sūtra would suggest the application of the same reasoning to both the alternatives contained therein; that is to say, non-mention by Śruti would be applied equally to pradhāna and the jīva, as grounds for excluding them; but in one case, non-mention is urged, and in the other, the incompatibility of omniscience, etc. Where two different sets of grounds are given, the reading as two sūtras would be preferable. Śrīkaṇṭha gives the reading of Rāmānuja, but not his interpretation.

7 & 8: Samprasāda, according to Śaṅkara, means deep sleep and since bhūmā is taught in addition to the bliss of deep sleep, it must mean Brahman. The reference cannot be to prāṇa. The pūrvapakṣa about prāṇa is set out and refuted elaborately. "Prāṇa" is used throughout as meaning vital air, not as denoting the jīva. For Rāmānuja, the suggestion to be refuted concerns the jīva; the contention that the vital air is here meant is lightly brushed aside, even by the pūrvapakṣin, as a preliminary to the main argument. Śrīkaṇṭha apparently refutes both suggestions at one breath; for to him prāṇa means

I, 3.

jīva. Thus, the greater part of Śaṅkara's argument and some part of Rāmānuja's become for him irrelevant. Either suggestion is possible, that Śrīkaṇṭha takes Rāmānuja's conclusion for granted, or that the latter expounds in detail what was set forth concisely by the former. Śrīkaṇṭha subjoins a disquisition on the mukta, whose vision is of a world harmonised with Brahman, though the world does not cease to exist for him.

12: Parameśvara is the person that is seen (the object of realisation), not Hiraṇyagarbha or Nārāyaṇa. Between Śiva and Viṣṇu, there is a difference only of function, as between the operative and the material causes of the world.

16: Both the daharākāśa and the being that resides therein are prescribed as objects of meditation, since freedom from sin, etc., are predicated of both. The two are related as dharma and dharmin, not as abode and he who abides.

41: The uttama puruṣa, said to be attained to when the self's own form is manifested, is Brahman, i.e., Parameśvara, not Nārāyaṇa, though the latter is generally denoted by the expression Puruṣottama. The etymological significance has to be taken here, and that refers to Śiva, who alone is higher than the world, higher than the jīvas.

I, 4.

5: To refute the Sāṅkhya appeal to the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara shows that the context refers to the Self by citing several texts such as "avyakatāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ" and so on, and incidentally mentions "yaccedvānmanasi prājña", etc. Rāmānuja does not mention this verse, presumably because it relates to the wise man, not the highest Self. Śrīkaṇṭha, however, quotes only that verse, depart-

I, 4.

ing in this respect even from Śaṅkara, who apparently takes it to refer to the individual. Appayya argues that the citation proves Śrīkaṇṭha to have held the individual and Brahman to be non-different.

14 & 15: These, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, form part of the preceding topic, the saṅkhyopasaṅgraha adhikaraṇa which determines the sense of the expression pañcajanāḥ to be the sense-organs. Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Rāmānuja take both sūtras to establish that Brahman alone is the cause; they meet difficulties raised on the ground of conflicting accounts of the creational order or conflicting statements about the cause, that it was "sat" and again that it was "asat". The former class of objections has little weight; and as for the latter, it can be shown by upakrama, upasaṃhāra, etc., that "asat" means not non-existence, but Brahman. On this, Śrīkaṇṭha would appear to introduce a refinement; just as by upakrama and other marks it is shown that "asat" means Brahman, similarly, it must be determined with reference to what precedes and follows that pañcajanāḥ refers to the senses. The procedure is rather clumsy, goes against the usual practice of Śrīkaṇṭha, to render each sūtra and topic clearly defined, and on the whole, seems a needless refinement.

27: The doctrine of apūrva pariṇāma has distinctive features in that it rests on the doctrine of Śiva and Śakti, the former of whom existed in the beginning, while the latter followed from Him. As a result of this, the Lord who, in his kāraṇāvasthā, had name and form for his body only in a subtle state, then desired to have for his body the distinctions made manifest. Parameśvara is qualified by

I, 4.

māyā; the latter is an aṃśa of the former. Both are necessary for the production of the world, just as both soul and body are necessary for the growth of hair, nails, etc. Māyā in the capacity of enjoyer is called puruṣa (and this collective puruṣa is called Nārāyaṇa).

II, 1.

4-7: Both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja mention the production of scorpions from cow-dung in answer to the objection based on dissimilarity of alleged cause and effect. They also meet objections to the validity of the instance; it may be said that scorpions could not come out of dung, but for some identity of nature between the two. Śaṅkara investigates and demolishes the alleged identity, proves that mere reasoning can lead nowhere and appeals to Śruti. Rāmānuja prefers to adduce what he considers to be a more satisfactory instance, viz., the production of worms in honey. It is not known how this is a better instance. Śrīkaṇṭha has recourse neither to the worm nor to Śruti, since he does not notice the difficulty at all. But he too mentions another instance, the growth of hair, nails, etc., and he has already shown that this effect, though non-different from the body, comes into being only when the body is presided over by the soul. If he had noticed the difficulty, he could hardly have given a more effective reply.

8-12: Constitute a new topic, the apītyadhikaraṇa.

18: In refuting the theory that "asat" is the cause, the doctrine of Śiva and Śakti is set forth again.

19: The expression "paṭavacca" is explained in the light of a folded piece of cloth being unrolled and set up as a tent; the illustra-

II, 1.

tion is also found in the *Sivajñāna Siddhiār* and the *Ratna-traya (RTS)*.

24: In disposing of the objection that instrumental causes are required for creation, an irrelevant suggestion is introduced about diversity in the effect possibly requiring diversity in the cause too; and this is refuted by appealing to the instance of the growth of hair, nails, etc. (diverse effects) in the single *puruṣa*.

28: The word "ātman" in "Ātmanicaivam vicitrās ca hi" is taken to refer to the *jīva*, not Brahman as interpreted by Rāmānuja. Śaṅkara too understands the reference to be to the *jīva*, but there the similarity stops, the purpose of the present argument being the same as that understood by Rāmānuja, viz., to show that Brahman, who is known through Śruti alone, may quite conceivably possess diverse attributes. The argument is slightly different from Rāmānuja's. The non-intelligent world itself is not homogeneous, but contains elements with diverse attributes; the *jīva* possesses attributes different from these, such as being agent, enjoyer, and so on. Hence Brahman may well have manifold diverse attributes.

34 *et seq*: These are treated as a separate topic, different from that inaugurated by sūtra 32, "Na prayojanavātvāt"; a full discussion of karma, release and the need for creation is introduced at this stage.

II, 2.

11: The expression "ubhayathā" denotes having regard to *vipāka* (of *adrṣṭa*) or not having regard thereto; while Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja take the alternatives to relate to the inherence of *adrṣṭa* in souls or in atoms.

II, 2.

18: In the criticism of the Buddhist causal chain (*itaretarapratyaya*) it is said that the mistaking of mother-of-pearl for silver does not produce silver, and that since the person who is enlightened passes away at the very same instant, there can be no production of desire or aversion or any of the other elements in the chain. Rāmānuja says that the mistaken notion about the mother-of-pearl does not explain the existence of the collocation known as mother-of-pearl, and it is this which is difficult to explain on the Buddhist hypothesis of *kṣaṇikatva*. And, he adds, since the subject that is thus deluded is itself momentary and passes away with the moment of the delusion, the consequent desire and aversion and their results will be effected, if at all, in a series of different subjects; and it is absurd to say that one man's ignorance is the cause of another's suffering. The objection so stated is coherent and forcible. There is no point in saying that the mother-of-pearl though mistaken for silver does not really produce silver, for that it does produce silver is not the Buddhist contention. Rāmānuja's criticism is more to the point. And the statement about the enlightened person (*viduṣaḥ*) makes little sense; it is possible to understand it to say that though ignorance ceases for the enlightened person, since it is essentially one and homogeneous, its continuance in other subjects may produce desire and hatred even for the *vidvān*. The interpretation is strained and hardly suitable. One possible solution is that the word "avi-*duṣaḥ*" has been wrongly read as "viduṣaḥ". The printed texts do not countenance this view.

25 & 26: These are treated as a separate topic concerned with the refutation of the Sautrānti-

II, 2.

kas. The fact is recognised by Rāmānuja also, but he does not mark a fresh topic.

31: In the criticism of Jainism, Śrīkaṇṭha makes no reference to the Pāñcāstikāya doctrine, though Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja refer to it, the former as of secondary and the latter as of primary importance.

35-38: Though recognising the fact that a Śaiva Āgama doctrine is here refuted, Śrīkaṇṭha claims authority for both Vedas and Āgamas, the only difference being that the former may be studied by the first three castes alone, while the study of the latter is open to all; he also suggests that the criticism is directed only against the Hiraṇyagarbha Āgama or that it may even be an answer to an avāntara śaṅkā, a casual doubt, as to whether the Lord may be the efficient cause alone. Rāmānuja considers all Śaivite systems to be refuted in this adhikaraṇa.

41: Śrīkaṇṭha takes this sūtra to be not a criticism of the Pāñcarātra, but a modified statement of that doctrine, which even as thus modified, is unacceptable, as seen from sūtra 42. He agrees with Rāmānuja in the interpretation of sūtra 41, but not of sūtra 42.

II, 3.

8: The discussion as to the origination of vāyu is set out more elaborately than need be. This shows that our author does not always go in for conciseness; nor is he always careful, for in discussing a similar problem with reference to ākāśa, the claim of eternity made on behalf of it is neither investigated nor refuted.

14: That the elements are all caused immediately by Brahman is shown by reference to the names of the controlling deities—Sadāśiva,

APPENDIX III-C

II, 3.

Ratheśvara, Rudra, Janārdana and Brahmā, who are all forms of Parameśvara.

15: Though prāṇa and the senses are elsewhere spoken of as having originated either before or along with the elements, that is not irreconcilable with the order here set forth, as the sense-organs are constituted out of the elements and are of their inner being. Śaṅkara takes the sūtra to state that the order of involution is the reverse of that in evolution. Rāmānuja understands the sūtra to justify the immediate causation of each element by Brahman, as only then is it possible to justify statements as to creation which mention the reverse order of what is adopted here.

29-32: These sūtras are interpreted so as to justify the appellation of "knowledge" in the case of the self who is the "knower"; in this there is agreement with Rāmānuja, though the topical division adopted is that of Śaṅkara, according to whom, the jñādhikaraṇa begins and ends with II, 3, 19.

41: Śaṅkara refutes the charge of vaiśaṃya, Rāmānuja that of vaiyarthya; Śrīkaṇṭha meets both. The illustration employed is also distinctive; a young lad employed to carry a log of wood along with an older and stronger partner, without whose help he cannot even move the log, is yet the subject of commands, in so far as the lad has to make an effort to co-operate.

48: This is read as "Asantateścā'vyatirekaḥ" while the others read the latter half as "avyatikaraḥ". Śrīkaṇṭha understands from his reading that though the selves are manifold and discontinuous, there is yet a common feature of all their experiences. They all say "I am short, I am a brāhmin" and so

II, 3.

on. Experiences of the state of bondage are thus essentially similar, *though not mixed up* (asamkīrṇam). This absence of mixing up or confusion is what is meant by the reading "avyatikarāḥ", as adopted and understood by Rāmānuja. It is difficult to see what occasion there is in the present context for Śrīkaṇṭha to deny the possibility of confusion. Rāmānuja's statement is direct—that there is no confusion as to the merit and demerit of the various souls, as they are all distinct. Our author says, first that though they are distinct, their experiences are essentially similar; and having so read and interpreted the sūtra he adds, as an after-thought, that in spite of the similarity, the experiences are not mixed up. And there is a further after-thought offered as an indication of the purpose of this sūtra; it shows that the eternal infinite experience of released souls is very different in kind from that of the limited entities in bondage. Śrīkaṇṭha cuts a rather poor figure as interpreter, though as the statement of a logical position what he says is intelligible.

III, 2.

7 & 8: Discussing the resting place of the self in deep sleep, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja conclude that Brahman alone *directly* is the place of deep sleep, while adding that the other places mentioned are subsumed, not excluded. Śrīkaṇṭha does not state this or any other conclusion explicitly, contenting himself with the formula "samuccaya eva", meaning that all the statements made about the resting place should be taken together, not as exclusive of one another.

10: Śrīkaṇṭha mentions only three states besides that of swoon, while Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja enumerate four, death being the fourth. It

III, 2.

is only on this enumeration that the statement about swoon being half-way to death, is intelligible.

11: One of the passages cited in the siddhānta portion describes Śiva as paśupāśa vilakṣaṇa; Rāmānuja cites passages to establish the characteristics and supremacy of Viṣṇu.

14: The term "arūpavat" in "arūpavadeva hi", etc., is understood to mean ākāśa, the support of name and form being the function thereof. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja take the literal sense of the word, "that which is formless."

16: "Āha ca tanmātram." The mention of one form, that of undifferentiated knowledge, does not exclude other forms or attributes, as the mention of a golden crown does not exclude the possibility of its being set with gems. Further, Śruti itself predicates experience of diversity by Brahman, in referring to Brahman as vipaścit; vipaścit means "vividham vastujātam paśyanti vimṛśanti cid yasya sah."

17: Śrīkaṇṭha cites passages which describe the qualities of Śiva and glorify Him; the passages cited by Rāmānuja glorify Nārāyaṇa.

21: Śrīkaṇṭha commences a new topic, the prakṛtāitāvattvādhikaraṇa, while for Rāmānuja, a fresh topic commences only with sūtra 26. The manner in which the transition is effected from sūtra 21 to 22 is also different in the two. The opponent, according to Rāmānuja says that the denial of forms by the words "neti, neti" may be interpreted to mean the exclusion of all the attributes perceived as apparently belonging to Brahman; to this the reply is that Brahman is not the object of perception (sūtra 22). Śrīkaṇṭha's pūrva-pakṣin says that Brahman is but the exist-

III, 2.

ence that is revealed in all our judgments like "the pot exists," "the cloth exists," and so on; and the denial is intended to show that pot, etc., do not as such qualify Brahman. But Brahman cannot be the object of perception; hence the existence that is perceived as an accompaniment and an implication of our existential judgments is not Brahman.

24: The phrase "karmanyabhyāsāt" is interpreted in the light of the sense of identity with Brahman achieved by Vāmadeva and others, and after the analogy of the magician who acquires immunity from snake-poison by his incantation of the Garuḍa Mantra.

28: Though agreeing with Rāmānuja in the general position that the non-intelligent world is also an attribute of Brahman, a different ground is assigned for not accepting the relationship of species and genus mentioned in III, 2, 27. On this view as well as on that of III, 2, 26, it is thought that the defects of the world would attach to Brahman. Śrīkanṭha would seem to have treated the genus as a concrete universal; not so, Rāmānuja.

35, 36: Constitute a characteristic fresh topic devoted to the glorification of Śiva and the exaltation of Him over Nārāyaṇa.

40: To show that Brahman alone is the dispenser of rewards, Śaṅkara quotes texts referring to the Supreme Being, as Himself causing the performance of good and bad acts. Rāmānuja cites texts proving the efficiency of minor deities and infers their leading up to Brahman as their antaryāmin. Śrīkanṭha refers from the first to the deities as ensouled by Brahman; "Parameśvarātmakatayā vāy-vādīnām" and so on.

III, 3.

4: In showing that Śruti teaches the identity of the vidyās Śrīkanṭha, unlike Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, cites complementary passages, anticipating in part the purport of the next sūtra. Incidentally he utilises the opportunity to choose such passages as glorify Śiva. The passages selected are the *Mahānārāyaṇa* and the *Kaivalya* texts descriptive of the physical attributes of Śiva and the *Chāndogya* passages descriptive of the other perfections which He possesses, though endowed with bodily form.

5: This prescribes guṇopasaṃhāra and is treated as a distinct topic by Śrīkanṭha.

9: In recognising a new topic, Śrīkanṭha takes for granted the conclusion of Śaṅkara that vyāpti is viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-bhāva, and proceeds to set out arguments similar to Rāmānuja's.

11: All the attributes—Bliss, Truth, Knowledge, etc.,—should be understood in every meditation on Brahman; their number does not conflict with the unity of Brahman. It is only the attribution of contrary qualities like blue and white or short-horned and long-horned of the same subject, that introduces contradiction into the subject; not the predication of qualities like blue, sweet-smelling, large and lily in the case of a blue flower. Śrīkanṭha strikes an independent note and his argument is more subtle than that of Śaṅkara or of Rāmānuja.

14: Begins a new topic, the question being whether the sheaths of food, etc., are to be contemplated, they being apparently stages on the path of Bliss; the answer is in the negative, since their contemplation is of no value, and is excluded besides, for, these are not sheaths, but selves, and contemplation of any self except Śiva is excluded by Śruti. The

III, 3.

topic here discussed is mentioned by Rāmānuja as the import of sūtra 16 only, the previous two sūtras forming part of the preceding adhikaraṇa. The difference between the two extends to sūtra 17 also, "Anvayāditi cet syādavadhāraṇāt", Śrīkaṇṭha's explanation requiring the interposition of a negative particle; if it be said that the annamaya, etc., are also the objects of contemplation because of the connection of the word "Self" no, we reply, because of insistence. We are told repeatedly that the ānandamaya self is other than these and that Śiva alone is to be contemplated and so on. Rāmānuja takes the sūtra to justify the interpretation of the term "Self", as the highest Self, when used in conjunction with ānandamaya, in spite of the fact that it means only lower selves in the rest of the context, when spoken of in conjunction with annamaya and so on; for even in that context, the self in statements like "from the Self, ether emanates" refers to the highest Self. This interpretation, like that of Śaṅkara, who is concerned throughout with the explanation of an Aitareya passage, does not require a negative construction of the sūtra. Passages glorifying Śiva find place in the commentary on sūtras 15 and 17.

- 17: Śrīkaṇṭha agrees with Rāmānuja only to the extent of considering the viśaya vākyas to come from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*. While the latter says that the expression "Self" as denoting Brahman is to be understood as what is immanent in the annamaya, etc., sheaths, the former would have it that the expression is used in different senses in the two cases; the ānandamaya self is the Supreme Being, while the other selves are merely limited and particular and should not en-

III, 3.

ter into the meditation of the Highest; it is these that are excluded by the text "Sarvam anyat parityajya".

- 22: The maṇḍala vidyās of the *Chāndogya* and the *Taittirīya* (*Mahānārāyaṇa* portion) are identical. Though the latter refers only to golden arms (hiranyabāhu) yet the later mention of lordship of gold (hiranyapati) leads to the inference that all the limbs are golden even to the tips of the finger-nails, in the words of the *Chāndogya*. The sūtra constitutes a fresh adhikaraṇa and glorifies Śiva.
- 25: This sūtra, according to Śrīkaṇṭha, discusses whether the introductory passage of the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* "Śam no mitras śam varuṇaḥ", etc., is part of the vidyā, the answer being in the negative, on the ground that as seen from the sense of the passage, it is part of Vedic study, not meditation. Śaṅkara takes the sūtra to apply to all such passages wherever found, as they form part of sacrificial ritual, like the *Ātharvāṇika* passage "pierce the śukra, pierce the heart". Rāmānuja agrees with Śaṅkara, but applies the reasoning to the *Taittirīya* passage also, though that does not refer to any sacrificial ritual.

- 27-30: Śrīkaṇṭha considers 27 to 29 to state the pūrvapakṣa and 30 to state the siddhānta. According to Śaṅkara, 27 and 28 state the siddhānta the pūrvapakṣa being understood; 29 and 30 deal with related but different questions. Rāmānuja takes 27 and 28 to state the siddhānta; the pūrvapakṣin raises an objection in sūtra 29, to which sūtra 30 furnishes the reply. The position of the last two sūtras is reversed in Śrīkaṇṭha's text, that reading being adopted by none of the other commentators—Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Madhva, Vijñānabhik-

III, 3.

su, Vallabha and Baladeva. The position taken up is distinctive. Until the moment of final release, when Brahman is attained and the self stands revealed in its own form, there is saṃsāra; this does not end merely with death and so long as there is saṃsāra, karma also persists. (The matter has been dealt with more extensively in Chapter I; see also Appendices I: A and IV.)

- 32: At the end of the commentary on the sūtra, there is a reference to niranvaya—upāsakas for whom there is no departure by the devayāna.
- 38: Constitutes a new topic raising the question of the propriety of importing physical qualities like blue-throatedness into every vidyā, and deciding in favour of the importation.
- 39: This is, again, a fresh topic. The qualities mentioned in the last sūtra should on no account be omitted, since there is emphatic repetition. Śruti being our only source of information, whatever is taught thereby should be recognised.
- 42: Though the object of all vidyās is one, viz., Brahman, the vidyās themselves are different, because of difference of attributes. Brahman is likened to a king who demands different services from different servants. This illustration is distinctive, the comparison to Indra who receives different oblations in different capacities, being common to Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja also.
- 43: On the ground of the superiority of vākya to prakaraṇa, the oft-repeated qualities of Brahman such as Umāśahāyatva should be contemplated in every vidyā. Rāmānuja applies the same reasoning to the contemplation of Nārāyaṇa in every case.

III, 4.

- 13: This is treated by Śrīkaṇṭha as referring to “Īśāvāsyam idam sarvam”, etc., a text mentioned by Rāmānuja only in connection with sūtra 14.
- 20: Śrīkaṇṭha discusses rather fully the justification for saṃnyāsa and the stage when it may be adopted, whether one may or should pass to it straight from brahmacharya and so on.
- 22: It is said that the udgītha should be meditated on as the highest of all essences (rasatamaḥ) because of injunctive words. The sūtra uses the expression “bhāva śabdācca”; bhāva means becoming; both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja take the trouble to show that forms denoting becoming or origination have injunctive force, while Śrīkaṇṭha merely identifies bhāva with command, without any further ado.
- 32-35: Āśrama karma should be performed even by those who have no knowledge (*not* desire for release). Action may both lead to knowledge and reside as an element thereof. The two kinds of action are identical, because action possesses both the above characteristics (*not* because it is both enjoined and *not* prohibited *nor* because it is mentioned by both Śruti and Smṛti). They prevent knowledge from being overpowered (*not* the individual from being overpowered by passion, etc.). The words in brackets indicate the interpretation offered by Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.
- 38: Āśrama dharma, it is said, has a special efficacy in promoting knowledge, while Rāmānuja thinks that acts *not* exclusively pertaining to any āśrama conduce to knowledge.
- 47: Śruti closes with the mention of the householder's state to show that vidyā is attain-

III, 4.

able at all stages, not because the house-holder has to practise the virtue of all the āśramas (Śaṅkara) or because pāṇḍitya, bālyā, and mauna apply to all, not merely to ascetics (Rāmānuja).

48, 49: The Pāśupata vrata, if practised to the end and not merely for a limited period, leads to liberation. Though this is not expressly included in āśrama dharma, the virtues of chastity, begging, control of the senses, etc., are associated with this vrata. Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja hold that sūtras 47, 48 and 49 deal with the same topic and that sūtra 49 refers to bālyā, the state of non-manifestation (of arrogance, etc.).

50: Liberation may take place even in this life, if there are no counter-acting conditions; there is, however, no restrictive rule, as we see that Vāmadeva and others gained knowledge in this life, as the result of a previous life.

IV, 1.

3: Meditation is to be of Brahman as identical with the self, not as another Being. This is in great, though not complete agreement with Śaṅkara's view; it differs from Rāmānuja's interpretation according to which God is the Self of souls, as souls are the selves of bodies. This analogy elsewhere freely used by Śrīkaṇṭha is here abandoned.

5: This is treated as a new Brahmadṛṣṭyadhi-karaṇa, after Śaṅkara, though the argument is largely a repetition of that of sūtra 4, except where the praise of Śiva comes in. Rāmānuja's treatment of the two as belonging to the same topic seems more justifiable.

19: The question whether the cycle of re-birth is never-ending is discussed only with reference to "persons in office", possibly because Śrī-

IV, 1.

kaṇṭha considers the general question to have been already raised and answered.

IV, 2.

7: This relates to non-difference between the ignorant man and the enlightened one in respect of departure. The sūtra is read as a fresh topic. The last word of the sūtra "anupoṣya" is not found in some Manuscripts and is not commented on by Śrīkaṇṭha. It seems to mean "unburnt (adagdha)", and is used by Śaṅkara to confirm and by Rāmānuja to refute the advaitin's position.

8-10: Śrīkaṇṭha's topical division is the same as Śaṅkara's, but the interpretation is independent up to sūtra 10, which relates to the non-destruction of the subtle body along with the gross one.

13: At the close of the commentary, there is, again, a reference to niranvaya—upāsakas, for whom release comes about even with death.

14: The subtle elements to which the jīva is united are merged into Brahman, not as in their material cause, but only to the extent of their being indistinguishable therefrom. The alternatives contemplated are not return to Brahman and to causal substances (Śaṅkara) or return to Brahman, as opposed to their persistence and production of effects in conjunction with some other soul (Rāmānuja), but merger of being contrasted with merger of function. In adopting this interpretation, Śrīkaṇṭha anticipates in part sūtra 15, "Avibhāgo vacanāt".

IV, 3.

1: Once again, there is a reference to the niranvayopāsakas, for whom departure along the path of light, etc., is not needed. The reference to and the interpretation of the *Taittirīya* passage "vyapoḥya śirṣa kapāle", etc., is also distinctive.

IV, 3.

6-15: Śrīkaṇṭha considers Bādari, Jaimini, and Bādarāyaṇa to discuss the state which is led up to by the person in the lightning. To this extent, he agrees with Śaṅkara, but the latter considers Bādari's view to be the *sidhānta* and Jaimini's the *pūrvapakṣa*. Rāmānuja, like Śrīkaṇṭha, considers both Bādari and Jaimini to be refuted by Bādarāyaṇa in sūtra 14, but, unlike Śrīkaṇṭha, he takes the discussion to be not about the state led up to, but the person led up, whether it is he who meditates on the conditioned Brahman or he who contemplates the Highest Brahman.

IV, 4.

4: For Śrīkaṇṭha, equality with Brahman is in respect of the fulfilment of all desires; for Rāmānuja it is in respect of the purity attained on putting off the body. For the former, the *pūrvapakṣa* is based on the text that Brahman is one without a second, while for Śaṅkara, it relates to the distinction between agent and object, dweller and abode and so on.

9: This mentions the eight qualities of Śivatva realised by the released soul.

10-14: The citation of the *Śvetāśvatara* passage to establish the *prima facie* case for *videhatva* of released souls is distinctive. Arguments like the one based on "manasaitān kāmān paśyan ramate", etc., are common to Śaṅkara. Sūtra 14 discusses rather elaborately whether released souls, because of enjoyment consequent on the possession of bodies, will continue to be affected by *saṃsāra*, and decides that there is no ground for the fear, since they perceive all this as of the nature of Brahman. The position is supported by reference to the *Taittirīya* passage

IV, 4.

"Etat tato bhavati, ākāśa śarīram brahma", etc., and the beatific calculus.

22: The sūtra declaring non-return is not a separate topic for Śaṅkara or Rāmānuja. It is led up to from the previous sūtra, which affirms similarity between the Lord and the released soul, only in certain respects. "May not the difference imply return to *saṃsāra*?" is the question to which, in the view of those two commentators, the present sūtra furnishes a reply. For Śrīkaṇṭha there is an independent question "do the liberated ever return?", a doubt due to the knowledge of what happens to exalted personages like Indra. The discussion is very elaborate and is conducted with special reference to certain Purāṇic verses (from the *Sivadharmot-tara*); these are extensively commented on in the light of Upaniṣadic texts and the *Vedānta Sūtras* also.

APPENDIX IV.

Extracts from the commentaries of Nimbarka,
Ramanuja and Srikantha on Vedanta
Sutras, III, 3, 29 and 30.

Nimbarka.

III, 3.

29: Gaterarthavattvam ubhayathā'nyathā hi virodhah.

30: Upapannastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherlokavat.

Commentary.

Brahmopāsakasya śārīra viyoga kāle sarvakarma-
kṣaye'pi panthā upapannaḥ
yathā bhūpasevakasya bhaumārtha siddhis-
tadvat. Sasthūlaśārīra sarva karmakṣaye'pi
vidyāprabhāvāt viśiṣṭa sthāna gamanārtham
sūkṣmaśārīram anuvarttate.

Ramanuja.

29: Gaterarthavattvam ubhayathā'nyathā hi virodhah.

Commentary.

Dehaviyogakāla eva hi sarvakarmakṣaye sūkṣma-
śārīrasyāpi vināśasyāt, tathā sati kaivalyāt-
mano gamanam nopapadyate. Ata utkrānti-
samaye viduṣo niṣṣeṣakarmakṣayo anupapan-
naḥ. Attrottaram—

30: Upapannastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherlokavat.

APPENDIX IV

357

III, 3.

Commentary.

Upapanna evoktrāntikāle sarvakarma kṣayaḥ. .
 . Atah kṣīṇakarmāno'pi sūkṣmaśarīrayuktas-
 ya devayānena gamanamupapadyate. Katha-
 m sūkṣmaśarīramapyārāmbhakakarma vi-
 nāśe'vatiṣṭhati iti cet, vidyā sāmartyāḍiti
 brūmaḥ. Vidyā hi svayam sūkṣmaśarīrasyā-
 nārambhikāpi prākṛtasukhaḍuḥkhopabhoga-
 sādhana sthūlaśarīrasya sarvakarmaṇām ca
 niravaśeṣakṣaye'pi svaphalabhūta-brahma-
 prāpti pradānāya devayānena pathainam
 gamayitum sūkṣmaśarīram sthāpayiti. *Loka-*
vat—yathā loke sasyādisamṛddhyarthamāra-
 bdhe taṭākādike taddhetuṣu tadicchādiṣu
 vinaṣeṣvapi tadeva taṭākādikam aśīthi-
 lam kurvantastatra pāṇiyapānādikam kur-
 vanti, tadvat.

Srikantha.

29: Upapannastallakṣaṇārthopalabdherlokavat.

Commentary.

Dehaviyogakāle sarvakarmakṣaye'pi gatividhiru-
pānna eva brahmopāsakānām
Lokavat, yathā loke rājāśritānām puruṣānām
anitarapuruṣasādhāraṇa sarvārthasiddhiḥ.
Ato mārgaśrutirapi na bādhyate, dehaviyo-
gakāle sakala karmakṣaye'pi vidyāmāhāt-
myāllīṅga śārīrāvasthānena mārgagatiḥ . .
. Evam prāpte siddhānta ucyate—

30: Gaterarthavattvam ubhayathā'nyathā hi virodhah.

Commentary.

Yadyapi vidyā sāmāthyād devayānena
 gatiṣṭattaddeśaviharācandrasaṁvādādikam
 agrimavihārādivadupapadyate, tathā'pi yā-
 vadbrahmaṁprāptiḥ dhīsamkocarūpasamsārānu-

III, 3.

vṛttih vidyāsāmarthyānnopapadyata iti tan-
mūlabhūtakarmaleśānuvṛttiravaśyam eṣṭavyā.
Na ca parameśvarasamkalpaviśeṣādeva tada-
nuvṛttih syāditi vācyam, tasyaivāsmābhiḥ
karmā (mūla) tayocyamānatvāt. Na hi as-
manmate vihitaniṣiddhācaraṇaprayuktapara-
meśvarasamkalpavyatirekeṇa puṇyapāpe staḥ.

GLOSSARY.

A.

Abheda,

non-difference.

Abhrasabheśāna,

the Lord of the hall of gold, i.e., Naṭarāja.

Abhyāsa,

repetition, such as may serve as an indication of pur-
port.

Acitprapañca,

the non-intelligent world.

Adhikaraṇa,

a section comprising one or more sūtras, treating of
a particular topic; it is made up of five elements—
the subject-matter, the doubt, the *prima facie*
view, its refutation and the conclusion.

Adhikāra,

competency.

Adhikāraavidhi,

a prescription as to competency for undertaking any
act.

Adhikāribheda,

difference of persons in respect of competency.

Adhikāritva,

possession of competency.

Adhikopadeśa,

the teaching that the Supreme Being is higher and
greater than the universe.

Adhvās,

lit. paths; in Siddhānta terminology, they are con-
duits of the Divine Energy.

Adhyayana,

learning by rote.

